27 Oct 2006 20:27
Re: Distributing private key information at install time
Brendan Strejcek <brendan <at> cs.uchicago.edu>
2006-10-27 18:27:37 GMT
2006-10-27 18:27:37 GMT
(Sorry in advance if I got some of the attribution wrong, the quotes and forwardings made it a bit complicated.) <Menno.Willemse <at> johnguest.co.uk> on 04 October 2006 wrote: > That's secure, but it involves walking up to the machine, which I > don't want to do. They are in locked rooms or on remote locations. > Maybe the best solution is just to leave a CD, HD partition or > floppy in the machine with its crypto-information. I use a trick to get around this. If I have to install a fresh operating system on a truly blank machine, I need to physically be at the console. In that case, however, the machine was usually just delivered and has not been deployed yet. Once a machine has been installed, it has the ability to remotely reinstall itself with several supported operating systems. I use alternative kernels and the boot loader to accomplish this. Thus, once a machine has been installed physically once (in most cases) it can be reinstalled remotely. > All security > flies out of the window as soon as someone can touch the machine > anyway. That is not totally true. They may be able to take over the machine, but they will not be able to compromise confidentiality (that is, you can encrypt data on the disk). > If you want to do hands-off, unattended installs, I suppose there > just isn't a way that's 100% secure.(Continue reading)
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