Re: Anonymity

I2P is tunnelling (proxying).  Proxying imposes major speed costs, and when 
discussed earlier on the list, it seemed an unpopular idea.

I am currently working on a system to guarantee anonymity without speed costs 
by writing fake packets; the system is called Uso 
(http://www.daughtersoftiresias.org/uso/) (site is still in development).  I 
expect to have an alpha version out for basic demonstration the weekend after 
next, or somewhere in that vicinity.  All traffic is both anonymous and hard 
to filter.  There's a whitepaper on the site.

The current protocol implementation allows for bidirectional communication 
with anonymity on sent packets limited only by how picky your switch .  For 
incoming traffic, packets must be addressed to your subnet (and in some 
cases, to your specific machine, although the goal is to minimize those 
cases).  A second protocol that is on the horizon is unidirectional 
communication in which only the acks get proxied (in bulk), allowing the 
sender to remain highly anonymous without imposing significant proxying 
loads.

 - Karen

On Monday 14 March 2005 2:32 pm, Tom Kaitchuck wrote:
> I noticed on your web page you say:
>
> "Anonymity could be provided by proxying requests through intermediate
> nodes, so that neither the originator nor the provider of the results for
> any request can be determined. Although Kenosis currently works via simple
> HTTP, future versions may use SSL for link-based encryption and public-key
> encryption for end-to-end verification of the authenticity of requests and
> node metadata."