3 Aug 2006 00:47
Re: Possible packages - seccure
Brian M. Carlson <sandals <at> crustytoothpaste.ath.cx>
2006-08-02 22:47:00 GMT
2006-08-02 22:47:00 GMT
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 09:12:13PM +0200, Ulf Harnhammar wrote: > On Sun, Jul 30, 2006 at 01:51:48PM +0100, James Westby wrote: > > 2) I have an ITP[3] open for seccure[4]. I would be interested in an > > audit of the code. > > I have audited it now. I looked for the normal problems like buffer > overflows, format string bugs and NULL dereferencing without finding > any bugs at all. It's all well-written code by someone clueful. I don't > know very much about cryptography, so I have no idea whether the > program's encryption is easy to break or not. I've looked at the underlying primitives, but not their implementation. In short, if they are actually implemented properly[0], they are secure[1]. The long version (you can skip this) is that the signature is ECDSA (DSA over elliptic curve) and the encryption is ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme). Both are based on the Diffie-Hellman problem, which is what regular DSA is based on. DSA and Elgamal are what most people use for signing and encryption in OpenPGP, and they are presently considered secure. The benefit to elliptic curve cryptography is that the keys are smaller and it can be faster. Instead of multiplying or exponentiating, you can add or multiply points on the curve. The curve is such that adding two points will always produce a third point on the curve. The only other concern of mine is the method for creating keys. If the underlying curves are the ANSI standard curves, they are secure, but patented. That is part of the reason that GnuPG nor the OpenPGP standard include ECC algorithms. Someone may want to look at the curves(Continue reading)
> Nice! It would be useful if you would take a look at various Debian packages
> that implement some kind of encryption and start making noise if you find
> things that are obviously insecure (Caesar ciphers, hiding data with XOR,
> or whatever usual mistakes people do). I don't think anyone has done that,
> at least systematically, so it would be appreciated.
In case you are interested in other packages that could stand a
crypto review, let me just quickly plug my own
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