Len Zettel | 4 Sep 2004 01:41
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Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be "destroyed" thoroughly?

On Friday 03 September 2004 07:18 pm, David Kreil wrote:
> Dear Vijay,
>
> > I guess I took this off the list. It's OT, in my oppinion.
>
> Oh. Anywhere more appropriate to send it to that you could suggest at all?
> Now also trying freebsd-geom - would that have been the better place to
> send this to to start with?
>
> > I don't know much of anything about data recovery. But, if you can
> > recover data under 20 layers of random writes or 20 iterations of 0s,
> > then how *can* you wipe a hard drive? Short, preferably, of setting fire
> > to it :D
>
While i am not an expert in this area, I can not help but wonder---
Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what
circumstances?  My best guess is that recovering anything from
even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have
physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment
indeed.  That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment.
If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot
of other easier means of finding out what you are up to.  Otherwise, a
good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA.
   -LenZ-
> Sigh, tricky, yes. Apparently wiping with >20 repeats of random noise does
> the trick (say from /dev/random or arc4random generated). The difficulty
> with modern file systems / operating systems / disk drives is actually
> getting the patterns written to the magnetic media.
>
> I'm writing to the list because both assessing whether there really is a
(Continue reading)

David Kreil | 4 Sep 2004 02:36
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Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on-disk keys be "destroyed" thoroughly?


Dear LenZ,

> Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what circumstances?

The value of the blackening feature should be that you can give away the drive 
and your password, say, under pressure by the [court|mafia|whoever], without 
compromising any confidential information on the drive.

> My best guess is that recovering anything from
> even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have
> physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment
> indeed.  That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment.

Hmm, I much doubt that. True, you need a clean room and a magnetic force 
microscope. Even standard data recovery firms like www.dataclinic.co.uk, 
however, can recover data under up to 8 overwrites. (NB: No affiliation or 
recommendation there.)

Government agencies can go deeper (20x or possibly more but it gets 
increasingly more difficult).

> If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot
> of other easier means of finding out what you are up to.

Sure, like pointing an antenna at my computer while its running ;-)

I guess my main point is: If there is a blackening feature which is designed 
to give users peace of mind about disclosing their password under pressure, 
and it is known that data can be recovered underneath simple overwrites for a 
(Continue reading)

Vijay Kaul | 4 Sep 2004 01:55
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Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be "destroyed" thoroughly?

On Fri, 03 Sep 2004 19:41:18 -0400, Len Zettel <zettel <at> acm.org> wrote:

<snip>

> While i am not an expert in this area, I can not help but wonder---
> Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what
> circumstances?  My best guess is that recovering anything from
> even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have
> physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment
> indeed.  That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment.
> If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a  
> lot
> of other easier means of finding out what you are up to.  Otherwise, a
> good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA.
>    -LenZ-

I used to work in a lab and a co-worker had be a submarier for the US. He  
said that one of their projects was to figure out how to best destroy CDs  
for the government. Supposedly the CDs were recoverable even after  
cross-shredding. They either decided that melting them over a "heatsink"  
(coffee mug) in a microwave (also makes a nice ash tray) or going at them  
with an acetaline torch was the final solution.
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