4 Sep 2004 01:41
Re: gbde blackening feature - how can on disk keys be "destroyed" thoroughly?
Len Zettel <zettel <at> acm.org>
2004-09-03 23:41:18 GMT
2004-09-03 23:41:18 GMT
On Friday 03 September 2004 07:18 pm, David Kreil wrote: > Dear Vijay, > > > I guess I took this off the list. It's OT, in my oppinion. > > Oh. Anywhere more appropriate to send it to that you could suggest at all? > Now also trying freebsd-geom - would that have been the better place to > send this to to start with? > > > I don't know much of anything about data recovery. But, if you can > > recover data under 20 layers of random writes or 20 iterations of 0s, > > then how *can* you wipe a hard drive? Short, preferably, of setting fire > > to it :D > While i am not an expert in this area, I can not help but wonder--- Who are you worried about recovering the data, under what circumstances? My best guess is that recovering anything from even _one_ data over-write is going to require that the recoverer have physical posession of the drive and very sophisticated equipment indeed. That means they have to be some branch of a govermnment. If you are going to attract attention of that caliber there are likely a lot of other easier means of finding out what you are up to. Otherwise, a good hot fire ought to be pretty final even for the CIA. -(Continue reading)LenZ- > Sigh, tricky, yes. Apparently wiping with >20 repeats of random noise does > the trick (say from /dev/random or arc4random generated). The difficulty > with modern file systems / operating systems / disk drives is actually > getting the patterns written to the magnetic media. > > I'm writing to the list because both assessing whether there really is a
I guess my main point is: If there is a blackening feature which is designed
to give users peace of mind about disclosing their password under pressure,
and it is known that data can be recovered underneath simple overwrites for a
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